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█ Abstract  In 1688, the Irish scientist William Molyneux sent a letter to the philosopher John Locke in 
which he asked whether a man who had been born blind and whose experience of the world was based on 
senses other than vision, would be able to distinguish and name a globe and a cube by sight alone, once he 
had been enabled to see. This issue immediately raised considerable interest amongst philosophers, who, for 
centuries, have continued to speculate about how this issue might be resolved. More recently, the possibility 
of corrective surgery for people born with congenital cataracts, has offered a valuable opportunity to explore 
this topic experimentally. A discussion of how Molyneux’s question has been addressed over the centuries, 
allows us to investigate a number of intellectual challenges, involving a variety of fields, ranging from philos-
ophy, psychology and the cognitive sciences, to neuroscience. For instance, Molyneux’s question raises the 
question of whether sensory experience is specific to each sensory modality, or rather supramodal, and if a 
transfer of knowledge across modalities can be established. Molyneux’s question is also relevant to the dis-
cussion of whether, how and to what extent a concept of space can be developed by blind people. More gen-
erally, it concerns the idea of how conceptual knowledge is acquired and processed when vision is lacking. 
The present paper aims to provide an overview of all the issues raised by Molyneux’s question. 
KEYWORDS: Molyneux; Multisensory; Blindness; Nativism; Empiricism. 
 
█ Riassunto  Il problema di Molyneux: una finestra sull’interazione intermodale nella cecità – Nel 1688 lo scien-
ziato irlandese William Molyneux inviò una lettera al filosofo John Locke in cui chiedeva se un uomo nato cieco 
e la cui esperienza del mondo è basata su sensi non visivi, avrebbe potuto discriminare e nominare una sfera e un 
cubo semplicemente guardandoli, una volta acquistata la vista. La questione destò immediatamente grande inte-
resse tra i filosofi, i quali per secoli avevano cercato di trovare una soluzione speculativa a questo problema. In 
tempi più recenti, la possibilità di sottoporre a un intervento individui nati con cataratta congenita ha offerto 
un’occasione propizia per indagare il tema in via sperimentale. Discutere il modo in cui il problema di Molyneux è 
stato affrontato nei secoli, permette di considerare un gran numero di questioni intellettuali che abbracciano cam-
pi diversi, dalla filosofia, alle neuroscienze, passando per la psicologia e le scienze cognitive. Per esempio, il proble-
ma di Molyneux investe la questione se l’esperienza sensibile sia specifica per ogni modalità sensibile o se, invece, 
sia supermodale, e se si possa dare un passaggio di conoscenza da una modalità all’altra. Il problema di Molyneux 
investe anche come e fino e che punto il concetto di spazio possa essere sviluppato da persone non vedenti. Più in 
generale, riguarda l’idea di come la conoscenza concettuale è acquisita e processata quando la vista manca. Questo 
articolo intende fornire una visione d’insieme che abbraccia i diversi temi legati al problema di Molyneux. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Molyneux; Multisensorialità; Cecità; Innatismo; Empirismo. 
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I live among vague, luminous shapes 
that are not darkness yet1 
 
█ Introduction 
 
ON JULY 7, 1688, THE IRISH SCIENTIST Wil-
liam Molyneux (1656-1698), wrote a letter to 
John Locke (1632-1704) and presented him 
with the question which has since been known 
as, Molyneux’s question (or Molyneux’s prob-
lem). Molyneux, who had diverse intellectual 
interests, ranging from philosophy, politics, and 
optics, was married to a woman who happened 
to become blind during their marriage. 
Molyneux was interested to know whether a 
man who had born blind, and who thus has 
learnt to distinguish and name a sphere and a 
cube by touch, would be able to distinguish and 
name these objects only by looking at them 
once he acquired sight. Since Locke initially ig-
nored the question, Molyneux wrote a second 
letter, dated 2 March 1693, which was eventu-
ally quoted in Locke’s second edition of Essay 
concerning human understanding: 
 
Suppose a Man born blind, and now adult, 
and taught by his Touch to distinguish be-
tween a Cube and a Sphere (suppose) of 
Ivory, nighly of the same Bigness, so as to 
tell when he felt one and t’other, which is 
the Cube, which the Sphere; suppose then 
the Cube and Sphere plac’d on a Table, and 
the blind Man to be made to see. Query, 
whether by his Sight, before he touch'd 
them, he could now distinguish and tell, 
which is the Globe, which the Cube? I an-
swer not; For though he has obtained the 
Experience of how a Globe, how a Cube af-
fects his Touch, yet he has not yet attain’d 
the Experience, that what affects his Touch 
so or so, must affect his Sight so or so; or 
that a protuberant Angle in the Cube, that 
press’d his Hand unequally, shall appear to 
his Eye as it does in the Cube.2 
 
In that letter, Molyneux proposed a nega-
tive answer to his own question, claiming that 
experience is the only means through which the 
associations between seen and felt properties of 
external objects can be acquired. Locke replied 
and endorsed the negative answer proposed by 
Molyneux. According to Locke’s view, simple 
ideas of sensation, which are the most basic 
units of human thought, enter the mind 
through the discrete operation of organs of 
sense and can thus only arise in connection 
with sensory experience. However, there are 
simple ideas, such as space, extension, figure, 
motion, and rest, which are acquired by both 
sight and touch, and are thus called “common 
sensible”. In visually deprived people, the ac-
quisition of connections between sensory mo-
dalities is prevented. It thus follows that a per-
son who has just gained sight would be unable 
to tell which object is the sphere and which the 
cube because he is unable to recognize that vis-
ual and tactile mental representations of these 
shapes he/she has refer to the same properties.3 
In Locke’s words: «The blind man, at first 
sight, would not be able with certainty to say, 
which was the globe, which the cube whilst he 
only saw them».4 
However, as pointed out by Bruno and 
Mandelbaum,5 if ideas can be acquired via mul-
tiple sensory modalities which are strictly 
linked to each other, it is not clear why Locke 
rejected the possibility that the newly sighted 
man would be able to recognize the objects he 
now sees as those he had previously felt.6 Ac-
cording to some authors, Locke’s argumenta-
tion does not deal with the heterogeneity of the 
ideas received by touch and vision or their 
problematic association, but is rather a reflec-
tion on the specificity of sight.7 In this respect, 
Berchielli8 claims that what the newly sighted 
person must learn is how different shapes ap-
pear  in the visual modality, by progressively 
learning to associate the patterns of light, shade 
and color to concavities, convexities and in 
general to the spatial properties of the object. 
Possibly, a more parsimonious explanation 
of Locke’s negative answer to Molyneux’s prob-
lem can be suggested. In Locke’s view, experi-
ence can be conceived as composed of two 
parts, sensation and reflection. Differently from 
ideas of sensation, ideas of reflection are ac-
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quired through the objective observation of our 
own intellectual operations.  
The reception of ideas through impressions 
made by external objects upon the organs of 
sense constitutes the idea of reflection that 
Locke denominates perception, and perception 
always demands a certain degree of conscious 
attention to operate. Through this process, the 
ideas given by sensation are bound together in-
to the whole variety of complex entities re-
quired for knowledge. In this way, human be-
ings are enabled to abstract from the sensory 
information received by their organs and form 
new and more conscious general ideas. From 
this speculation, it follows that, in absence of 
experience, as in a condition of visual depriva-
tion, the process of perception cannot fully de-
ploy, thus preventing the creation of relations 
between simple ideas. From this perspective, the 
negative answer to Molyneux’s problem given by 
Locke could be based on the hypothesis that the 
ideas of sphere and cube of the newly cured 
blind person were not sufficiently abstract or 
general before visual exposure to the objects.9  
Nevertheless, an alternative interpretation 
of Locke’s understanding of Molyneux’s ques-
tion has been advanced.10 According to Schu-
macher, the negative reply to Molyneux’s ques-
tion given by Locke is justified by considering 
that immediately after gaining sight, the newly 
sighted is only able to perceive certain patterns 
of color and light. Since the newly sighted has 
not yet acquired the cognitive skills necessary 
to link these impressions to previously-
experienced tactile perceptions, he/she is una-
ble to “form” visual ideas of three-dimensional 
shapes. However, these conjectures are just a 
few of all the possible interpretations of Locke’s 
view, which is nonetheless never explicitly for-
mulated11 nor judged as plausible by some au-
thors.12 
Although Locke, like Molyneux, replied 
negatively to the query, it would be misleading 
to think that these two philosophers shared the 
same position on the matter. Whereas in the 
original statement of the problem, the newly 
sighted is only prevented from touching the 
sphere and the cube, Locke imposes the addi-
tional condition that the identification is made 
at first sight. In this way, the task is presumably 
performed right after the operation, with with-
out the possibility of observing the objects from 
different points of view13 or taking the time 
needed to refer to mathematical reasoning.14 
Locke’s reply is thus presumably biased by the 
fact that the idea of form received by the newly 
sighted right after gaining sight is likely incom-
plete lacking an extended appreciation of its 
three dimensional features. 
However, the main reason why the two phi-
losophers differ is that, unlike Molyneux, Locke 
drew a distinction between the capability of the 
newly sighted person to discriminate a sphere 
from a cube by touch and to give their correct 
names. According to some authors, for Locke it 
was even more important to disentangle this 
second aspect of the issue than to investigate 
the link between touch and vision.15 According 
to Locke’s belief that humans can only see 
shapes in two dimensions, it can be assumed 
that a person who has just gained sight would 
visually perceive a sphere as a circle and a cube 
as a square. If presented with both objects, he 
should be at least able to perceive a difference 
between the two, but could hardly – if so – 
name them correctly. In order to be able to 
suitably label the two objects, the person should 
have preliminarily learnt to link the two-
dimensional impressions to tangible three-
dimensional objects. This connection is imme-
diately apparent and made without conscious-
ness by people who have learnt from experi-
ence to associate circles or squares with various 
degrees of shades to their corresponding three-
dimensional shapes. It is this experience that 
underlies the capacity to recognize the “same-
ness” of seen and (actually) felt properties, and 
to bind them together into unitary percepts.16 
However, blind people have necessarily been 
deprived of any chance to learn associations be-
tween what is seen and what is touched, thus jus-
tifying the negative answer to Molyneux’s query. 
As can be inferred from this brief introduc-
tion, the reason why what Molyneux termed a 
“jocose problem” generated such great interest 
among the philosophers and scientists of his 
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time was that it raises a number of intellectual 
issues. As recently pointed out, Molyneux’s 
question can be considered to be «an orchestra 
of sub-problems».17 First, it raises the question 
of whether sensory experience is inherently 
specific to each sensory modality or instead su-
pramodal, with the latter term indicating the 
existence of sensory invariants across the sens-
es.18 In the first case, it could be assumed that 
the senses are separate and that early sensory 
experience informs the whole of subsequent 
experience. In contrast, the assumption of su-
pramodal sensory invariants implies common-
alities across the senses and the possibility of 
crossmodal transfer when exposed to experi-
ences in one sensory modality after prolonged 
practice with another. Second, the debate 
about whether a transfer of knowledge across 
modalities can be established is strictly related 
to the issue of whether perceptual knowledge is 
innate or based on experience.19 Incidentally, 
Molyneux’s question also concerns the idea of 
whether, how and to what extent a concept of 
space can be developed under conditions of 
visual deprivation.20 Lastly, the reflections on 
Molyneux’s question represent a window into 
the unique perceptual experience of sensory 
deprived people, which has been inspirational 
for a number of literary and artistic works.21 
The present paper aims to cover these issues, 
by intertwining the philosophical speculations 
and empirical evidence that have been present-
ed during the last two centuries. 
 
█ Eighteenth-century philosophical  
 debate about Molyneux’s problem 
 
The debate inspired by Molyneux’s ques-
tion has been historically described as a con-
trast between philosophers giving affirmative 
or negative answers to his query. However, as 
will emerge from the present coverage of the 
topic, the complexity of the issues prompted by 
Molyneux’s writing generated a number of di-
vergent perspectives and additional sub-queries 
within the philosophical community.22 
One of the scholars who responded nega-
tively was George Berkeley (1685-1753), who 
in his An essay towards a new theory of vision23 
strongly asserts the absence of common ideas 
between touch and sight: «[...] nor is there any 
such thing as one idea, or kind of idea, com-
mon to both senses».24 Berkeley claims that 
tactual and visual appearances are qualitatively 
different: whereas sight has light and color as 
immediate objects, geometrical properties of 
objects can be accessed by touch only. Moreo-
ver, touch provides direct access to external ob-
jects, while visual ideas vary as a function of 
other factors. For instance, the visible size of an 
object varies with distance from the observer, 
whereas the size of the corresponding tangible 
object is constant. It is only after learning which 
ideas derived from the sense of touch are most 
frequently experienced in concert with certain 
ideas of sight that it is possible to draw corre-
spondences between the two senses. But visual 
ideas only «suggest tactile ideas».25  
Assuming that the same ideas can be deliv-
ered from different senses implies that those 
ideas are sufficiently general to transcend the 
uniqueness of knowledge provided by each 
sense. Such a statement would be in contrast 
with the empiricist view that there is no 
knowledge that does not derive from sensory-
based experience. In the absence of any supra-
sensory (or supramodal) ideas, it follows that 
the newly sighted person invoked by 
Molyneux’s problem would be unable to detect 
any commonalities between objects seen and 
those experienced tactually:  
 
to ask of the two bodies he saw placed on 
the table, which was the sphere, which the 
cube, were to him a question downright 
bantering and unintelligible; nothing he sees 
being able to suggest to his thoughts the 
idea of body, distance, or, in general, of any-
thing he had already known.26  
 
Like Locke, Berkeley also emphasizes that, 
even though a person born blind could have the 
same visual perception as the sighted after sight 
restoration, it would be problematic for 
him/her to correctly name the cube and the 
sphere and, more generally, to label anything 
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he/she sees: «the ideas of sight are all new per-
ceptions, to which there be no names annexed 
in his mind».27 He even claims that it would 
probably be troublesome to understand the 
question.28 His position is more extreme than 
his predecessors, since he hypothesizes that, 
given the heterogeneity of sight and touch, it 
can be assumed that there cannot be an idea of 
“space” in common between touch and sight.29 
Molyneux’s problem then reached France 
via Voltaire (1694-1778), who tangentially cov-
ered the topic in his Elements of Newton’s Phi-
losophy.30 Voltaire endorsed Berkeley’s claim 
that a person who just gained sight would be 
unable to discern ideas like shapes, sizes, posi-
tions, and distances. By contrast, the French 
philosopher Étienne Bonnot de Condillac 
(1715-1780) adopted a more critical position 
toward Berkeley’s thought. The cause of con-
cern expressed by Condillac lies in the promi-
nence Locke gives to the inferences built on 
sensations instead of to sensation itself.31 Ac-
cording to Locke, our perceptions are only in-
ferences, or, as in Locke’s terms, “judgements”, 
about sensations. For instance, it is because it is 
known that the spatial properties of the objects 
do not change when the objects change posi-
tion, and when we move relative to the objects, 
that the insight of the invariance of the objects 
is acquired. This theory has been defined as 
“unconscious inference” and is often ascribed 
to the nineteenth century physiologist Her-
mann von Helmholtz.32 In Helmhotz’s view of 
human perception, sensations originate from 
physical processes, but are only symbols – not 
copies – of the external stimuli. It is necessary 
for our brain to make a series of mental ad-
justments, “unconscious inferences”, to as-
semble sensory inputs into a coherent experi-
ence. Consistent with the theory of uncon-
scious inference, if the experience of images is 
precluded, as in men born blind, thus it fol-
lows that some processes of inference are pre-
vented. 
In his Treatise on the sensations,33 Condillac 
rejected Locke’s conjecture that human 
knowledge is founded on two sources, that is, 
sensation and reflection. He reconciled this du-
al foundation into sensation alone, being the 
source of all ideas and mental operations. In 
this context, ideas are considered to be differ-
ent stages in the development of sensations, re-
quiring voluntary operations such as attention. 
In support of his stance, he proposed a well 
known thought experiment. He asks his read-
ers to imagine an inanimate human being, just 
like a “statue”, who has never received any sen-
sory impressions, being progressively endowed 
with each of the senses in isolation, or each in 
combination with one or two of the others. In 
Condillac’s conception, the statue is initially 
senseless, and then acquires each sense one by 
one, allowing him to speculate about the specif-
ic functions of each sense. He claims that, dif-
ferently from the other senses, which can just 
convey mere sensations, only touch can endow 
the statue with the ability to compute the ideas 
of external objects, including the ideas of shape, 
size, spatial location and solidity. It is through 
tactile experience that the statue learns to dis-
tinguish between the impressions given by 
touching its own body, and external objects or 
the bodies of others, thus acquiring the distinc-
tion between self and non-self. In successive 
stages, the statue first combines the tactile im-
pressions of objects with the smell and sound 
they produce, and then with the size and the 
color of their visual images, thus eventually ac-
quiring the idea of movement and distance.  
According to Condillac, in order to acquire 
all knowledge nothing is necessary other than 
experiencing a sufficiently rich array of sensa-
tions. In the case hypothesized by Molyneux, 
provided that sight is fully gained right after 
surgery, the newly-sighted could be supposed 
to see the objects, but not to look at them «with 
order and method».34 On the basis of the 
prominence that touch has in human percep-
tion, Condillac believed that newly sighted 
people would not be able to distinguish differ-
ent shapes only by sight. Indeed, tactile experi-
ence and its referral to the other senses is neces-
sary in order to develop the capacity to distin-
guish between a cube and a sphere after a pro-
longed period of blindness. Unlike Locke, how-
ever, Condillac states that practice does not 
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merely consists in passively receiving infor-
mation nor in being able to assign names to 
sensations, but in an active and much more 
complex process. It follows that the newly-
sighted would be able to visually distinguish a 
cube and a sphere right after gaining sight but, 
in order to discriminate and thus name them, 
has to deploy his/her cognitive capabilities. 
From what it has just been stated, it is clear 
that the philosophers answering Molyneux’s 
question in the negative believed that the rela-
tionship between visual and tactile impressions 
of an object are arbitrary, and thus relative con-
cepts can only be related by either experience 
or understanding. By contrast, those philoso-
phers who provided a positive answer claimed 
that visual and tactile sensations are necessarily 
linked, and the relative concepts, when not the 
same, have something in common that can be 
immediately perceived.35 The first recorded ac-
count among the latter group of answers in-
cludes that provided by Edward Synge (1659-
1741) in a letter dated 6 September 1695 writ-
ten to Molyneux, then transmitted to Locke 
and published in Some Familiar Letters between 
Mr. Locke and several of his friends.36 In his re-
ply, Synge distinguishes between “images”, 
which are heterogeneous, and “ideas”, allowing 
the immediate recognition of common features 
of the tactile and visual images. According to 
Synge, a person who gains sight is immediately 
aware of the difference of the visual images 
provided by a sphere and a cube. For each shape, 
he/she will be able to perceive, respectively, the 
correspondence between its visual image and its 
tactile idea and its difference from a visual image 
of another shape. These relationships will enable 
him/her to correctly label which is the sphere 
and which is the cube.37 
Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) argued along 
these same lines, that, in addition to knowledge 
acquired through experience, there are also in-
nate representations.38 Even more importantly, 
according to Leibniz, shape representations 
generated by different sensory modalities con-
tribute to give sensory percepts a common 
structure.39 In this respect, the common-
sensible shape representations delivered by sen-
sory experience trigger the related common in-
nate representations. In the present context, 
stating the existence of innate representations 
results in an assumption that even blind people 
can have rudiments of geometry and build 
shape representations. When presented with 
geometrical shapes, the newly sighted would 
detect a commonality between what is seen and 
its inner perception. In this way, the sensory 
format of the experience is overcome, the 
common spatial features are connected and 
trigger the knowledge housed in the mind, and 
in the end shape identification is achieved. 
Leibniz specifies that an essential caveat of the 
thought experiment proposed by Molyneux is 
that the newly sighted is able to distinguish 
three-dimensional objects using both sensory 
information and imagination only if told be-
forehand that he/she would be shown a sphere 
and a cube.40 Only under this condition and by 
assuming that the distinction is not done at 
first sight (which, as it has been explained 
above, was one of the conditions imposed by 
Locke), the newly sighted would be able to give 
a definition of the shape of an object, thus pro-
ceeding from images of objects to exact ideas.41 
Although triggered by sensory experience, in-
nate common shape representations are neces-
sary and accessed by imagination, a kind of “in-
ternal sense”, instead of conscious inference.42 
Unlike Leibniz, who stated that visual and 
tactile notions of objects share properties which 
can be inferred by imagination, Thomas Reid 
(1710-1796), in his An Inquiry into the Human 
Mind on the Principles of Common Sense43 de-
fended the view that these sensory features dif-
fer among the senses, and can only be related 
by reasoning. Pivotal in his thought is the dis-
tinction between sensation and perception. A 
sensation is a feeling, peculiar to one sense, 
which exists exclusively in the mind of the per-
ceiver and has nothing in common with the ex-
ternal objects. Perception is not specific to each 
sense, but is shared by several senses and forms 
their common background, and always in-
volves objects outside ourselves. The different 
senses can convey the same perception by 
means of different sensations, in the same way 
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words from different languages, though differ-
ing from each other, can mean the same thing. 
The knowledge of the objects of sense is ac-
quired by reasoning, distinguishable from both 
sensation and perception.44 Reid believed that 
the capacity for performing mathematical and 
geometrical reasoning should be considered 
crucial in Molyneux’s question. Simply by using 
his/her faculty of sight, the newly sighted 
would perceive the same visible appearances of 
objects as do sighted people, but he/she would 
not understand their significance, their lan-
guage. In order to do so, mathematical reason-
ing is necessary. In support of his stance, he 
speculated about what might happen if Dr. 
Saunderson, a blind professor of mathematics 
who – remarkably – was at that time teaching 
optics in Cambridge, would gain sight. In 
Reid’s view, Dr. Saunderson would be able to 
derive the visual form of an object as well as its 
distance and position in space. Like Berkeley, 
Reid believed that properties like depth or spa-
tial distance do not inherently belong to exter-
nal objects, but are acquired through percep-
tion: «the visible appearance of objects is a 
kind of language used by nature to inform us of 
objects’ distance, magnitude and figure».45 
These notions, which are learned by sighted 
people by repeatedly experiencing the associa-
tions between visual and tactile cues, would be 
equally accessible to Dr. Saunderson through 
mathematical reasoning.  
Although Reid considered sight as “the no-
blest” of the five senses,46 he believed that blind 
people could understand the nature and opera-
tion of light, the laws of reflection and refrac-
tion of rays, as well as acquire notions com-
monly acquired by sight, such as order, distance 
and motion. Thus, if adequately informed by 
others, blind individuals could, by means of re-
flection, conceptualize the extension and shape 
of objects, and how their magnitude varies as a 
function of the distance from the observer’s 
eyes. According to Reid, whereas touch allows 
apprehending the notions of both two- and 
three-dimensional objects, sight initially pro-
vides the concept of two-dimensional objects 
only. Indeed, concepts of depth or distance in 
the third dimension can be perceived by sight 
only through the associations of tactile and vis-
ual information. It thus follows that, in Reid’s 
conception, the newly sighted would not rec-
ognize the shapes formerly known by touch be-
cause he would not perceive three-dimensional 
objects at all. The faculty of sight alone would 
not allow him/her to process the appearances 
of shapes in a way that would allow disentan-
gling the two objects, since visual appearances 
by themselves do not univocally indicate the 
figure of the objects projected onto the eye. For 
this reason, consistent with what Leibniz had 
suggested, Reid adds that it is pivotal to tell the 
newly sighted which objects he/she will be 
asked to distinguish. Without this hint, Dr. 
Saunderson would probably be misled and not 
be able to infer that the figures he was seeing 
were not two dimensional forms.47  
The importance of how the inquiry is for-
mulated as well as the intelligence of the re-
spondent is also discussed by Denis Diderot 
(1713-1784) in his Letter on the blind for the use 
of those who see.48 In his writing, Diderot also 
mentioned Dr. Saunderson and through his de-
scription of this case delivered his response on 
the issue of the crosstalk between vision and 
touch and, more generally, between sensory ex-
perience and ideas. The high mastery of geo-
metrical and physical phenomena shown by Dr. 
Saunderson had been made possible by the use 
of tangible materials (he invented a tactile ci-
phering tablet to perform arithmetical opera-
tions). This evidence led Diderot to the hy-
pothesis that tactile experience is inherently 
spatial and informs the eye.49 This assumption 
was strengthened by the direct observation of a 
born-blind man living in a small French city, 
thereafter known as the “blind man of 
Puiseaux”. Diderot was impressed by his high 
proficiency in tactile exploration of objects, in 
discriminating weights and textures and detect-
ing objects by means of the air movements per-
ceived on his face, a skill that was later defined 
as “facial vision”.50 When Diderot asked the 
blind man about the relationship between vi-
sion and touch, he replied that sight is a sort of 
touch which extends to distant objects. Re-
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covering vision, he declared, would be like 
having longer arms to explore the environ-
ment around him by touch. In this way, the 
blind man of Puiseaux raised a number of the-
oretical issues. For instance, posing the ques-
tion of whether there is specificity to tactile 
experience as opposed to visual experience; or 
if instead these two sensory experiences can be 
analogized.  
This early speculation of a functional analogy 
between visual and tactile perception has been 
confirmed by the observation that the fingertip, 
like the fovea, because of a high concentration of 
nerve terminations, is endowed with the highest 
discriminative capacity, and has recently result-
ed in the suggestion that haptic exploration can 
be considered as foveation without peripheral 
vision.51 The analogy between touch and sight is 
extended to handheld prosthetic devices, such as 
canes or sticks, commonly used by blind people. 
Indeed, in his Optics, René Descartes considers a 
sighted person lost in the darkness, trying to 
build up a representation of the surrounding 
place by tapping around him with a stick, and 
draws a comparison with the cane used by the 
blind to explore the space around the body and 
acquire cognition of space:  
 
this kind of sensation is somewhat confused 
and obscure for those who do not have long 
practice with it. But consider it in those 
born blind, who have made use of it all their 
lives: with them, you will find, it is so perfect 
and so exact that one might almost say that 
they see with their hands.52 
 
Another issue raised by the blind man’s tes-
timony is whether touch constitutes a more re-
liable path to knowledge than vision. Indeed, 
the blind man of Puiseaux seems to conceive of 
touch in terms of vision. Diderot theorizes that 
tactile experience, endowed with a spatial com-
ponent, aids and informs the eye: «it cannot be 
doubted that touch serves a great deal to give 
the eye precise knowledge of the conformity 
between an object and the representation of it 
that the eye receives».53 This view nevertheless 
echoes the Cartesian concept of perception, ac-
cording to which vision is modelled after the 
sense of touch. Diderot also draws a corre-
spondence between the senses: even though the 
functioning of one sense can be improved and 
accelerated by the observations of another, the 
senses maintain a specificity of their own, thus 
excluding complete equivalence between them. 
By contrast, postulating an underlying corre-
spondence between the senses implies disre-
garding the specificity of each sense and – to a 
certain extent – considering perception to be 
supramodal, thus not tied to a particular senso-
ry modality. In any case, the lack of empirical 
evidence at the time made it difficult to answer 
these theoretical questions. 
 
█ Empirical contributions to the debate 
 
In the first instance, the problem posed by 
Molyneux could not be considered by his peers 
as more than a thought experiment, an experi-
ment that can be exclusively conducted in the 
realm of the imagination. At that time, philos-
ophers believed it to be impossible that a man 
born blind could eventually acquire sight. 
However, in the mid-eighteenth century, de-
tailed reports of cataract operations started to 
appear, making it possible to consider the real 
possibility of recovery from blindness. Among 
these reports, evidence from a set of surgical 
operations performed by Cheselden dominated 
the debate. Cheselden operated on a boy of 
thirteen, who gained sight after removal – 
some months apart – of both lenses rendered 
opaque by cataract. After the removal of the 
cataracts, Cheselden’s patient described his ex-
perience of visual objects as “touching” with his 
eyes, just as perceiving objects by touch re-
quires them to be in contact with the skin sur-
face. He reported being unable to visually dis-
tinguish the «the shape of any thing, nor any 
one thing from another, however different in 
shape, or magnitude».54  
Conceiving distance and perspective were 
problematic as well, as demonstrated by the 
fact that when examining a painting he had to 
touch its surface to confirm there was only a 
two-dimensional representation. From these 
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pieces of evidence, Cheselden inferred that the 
absence of visual experience had compromised 
the patient’s capacity for perceiving and repre-
senting the spatial properties of objects exclu-
sively perceived by sight:  
 
He knew not the Shape of any Thing, nor 
any one Thing from another, however dif-
ferent in Shape, or Magnitude; but upon be-
ing told what Things were, whose Form he 
before knew from feeling, he would careful-
ly observe, that he might know them again; 
but having too many Objects to learn at 
once, he forgot many of them; and (as he 
said) at first he learned to know, and again 
forgot a thousand Things in a Day. One 
Particular only (tho’ it might appear trifling) 
I will relate; Having often forgot which was 
the Cat, and which the Dog, he was asham’d 
to ask; but catching the Cat (which he knew 
by feeling) he was observ’d to look at her 
steadfastly, and then setting her down, said, 
So Puss! I shall know you another Time.55 
 
Although at first the patient was unable to 
name what he was seeing, he proved to be able 
to learn the names of the things he perceived. 
Touch still remained his prevalent source of 
knowledge, as documented by the fact that he 
had to manipulate the painting in order to as-
certain that the images represented felt like flat, 
and not like three-dimensional solid bodies. 
Feeling constantly deceived by the impressions 
received by his senses, he «asked which was the 
lying sense, feeling, or seeing?».56 It must be 
pointed out that contributing to solve 
Molyneux’s problem was not among Chesel-
den’s purposes; he was probably not even 
aware of the existence of the debate. The report 
written by Cheselden was primarily aimed to 
describe the recovery of visual capabilities oc-
curring in his patient after the surgery. For this 
reason, the testing the patient underwent dif-
fered considerably from that hypothesized in 
Molyneux’s original formulation: the patient 
was not presented with geometrical solids and 
asked to name them, but rather observed ob-
jects while conducting his daily activities.  
The report by Cheselden was inconclusive 
for a number of methodological reasons. For 
instance, some philosophers thought that the 
self-report of the patient might have been in-
fluenced by Cheselden’s suggestive questions or 
even by possible coexisting cognitive deficits. 
They also remarked that Cheselden’s patient 
might have been unable to adequately perform 
perceptual tasks because of the aftereffects of 
the operation and the lack of sufficient time for 
recovery.57 Moreover, the assumption that the 
patient had been totally blind before the opera-
tion seems rather speculative, given that pa-
tients suffering from cataract often have visual 
experiences of various degrees and duration. Be-
cause of these downsides, the observations made 
by Cheselden, while providing interesting in-
sight into the ongoing debate, could not be con-
sidered decisive.58 In particular, Cheselden’s ear-
ly report about cataract treatment leaves unan-
swered the crucial question posed by Molyneux’s 
problem about the ability of the patient to cor-
rectly distinguish and label different shapes. 
After Cheselden case in 1728, other cases of 
operations restoring vision in patients were re-
ported in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. In 
1932, Dr. von Senden wrote an exhaustive re-
view of the clinical reports describing the per-
ception of space by the congenitally blind before 
and after these operations, shedding light on the 
process by which the perception of shape was 
acquired by these patients.59 In some of the ex-
periments described by von Senden, ophthal-
mologists specifically addressed Molyneux’s 
problem by performing experiments with the 
prescribed sphere and cube, nevertheless provid-
ing conflicting evidence.60 Indeed, whereas 
Nunneley reported that his patient was able to 
perceive a difference in their shapes, the patient 
tested by Von Hippel was not able to form the 
notion of specific shapes.61 The patient tested by 
Von Hippel exclusively relied on touch to derive 
the idea of the objects presented. Thus, what 
was “sphere” or “cube” for her could not be as-
similated to the abstract concepts of those 
forms, but rather to the tactile impressions of 
the specific objects being tested. Moreover, 
both patients were unable to correctly name the 
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shapes presented.62 From the cases summarized 
in his report, von Senden drew the conclusion 
that the patients could distinguish the presence 
of different objects and localize them at dis-
tance. However, from the evidence showing 
that none of the patients (with probably only a 
single exception)63 was able to correctly identify 
(not to speak of name) the forms presented, 
von Senden concluded that spatial awareness 
cannot be acquired in the absence of sight. The 
cases reported by von Senden are nevertheless 
difficult to compare, given the poverty of the 
descriptions and the lack of homogeneity of the 
pre- and postoperative circumstances, such as 
the level of residual vision patients had prior to 
the operation, their speed of recovery after-
wards and the typology of the disease treated.64  
In 1963 Gregory and Wallace reported res-
toration of sight in an adult patient, SB, who 
had suffered from a corneal disease.65 Gregory 
and Wallace provide a detailed description of 
the course of the recovery following the opera-
tion. The patient quickly regained the capacity 
to recognize various colors, which he had par-
tially mastered during his pre-operative experi-
ence. SB was also rather proficient in recogniz-
ing certain kinds of shapes (i.e., upper case let-
ters, a clock), but not others (i.e., lower-case let-
ters). Interestingly, SB had been taught to read 
upper-case letters – but not lower-case letters – 
by touch at the blind school, from engraved 
wooden blocks. The authors thus attributed 
SB’s capacity to recognize shapes to an ability 
to transfer his understanding of the shapes he 
had learnt by touch into the corresponding vis-
ual perception: «he could see immediately, 
from earlier touch experience».66 
In their report, Gregory and Wallace noted 
that SB experienced difficulties in interpreting 
what he saw. These difficulties derived from his 
incapacity to learn to integrate spatial infor-
mation over space and time, which is a prereq-
uisite for integrating visual experiences into a 
unitary percept. Indeed, to do so, it is necessary 
to acquire the various appearances an object 
offers from different perspectives, to briefly 
store them, and to infer from these pieces of 
information the continuity of the original three 
dimensional forms. Moreover, SB was unable 
to use depth cues to perceive dynamic changes 
in visual appearances. As a consequence, he 
could only recognize faces when they moved. 
The perception of distance was also problemat-
ic, given that his familiarity was restricted to 
the objects he could experience via touch and 
he lacked constancy scaling,67 which greatly af-
fected his self-confidence in navigating and ex-
ploring the environment. Moreover, just be-
cause he tended to perceive pictures as flat and 
meaningless, he was less prone to well-known 
illusion figures.68 Sacks reported analogous evi-
dence in his description of a patient with re-
stored sight, Virgil. Like SB, Virgil found walk-
ing “scary” and “confusing:69  
 
During these first weeks [after surgery] I 
had no appreciation of depth or distance; 
street lights were luminous stains stuck to 
the window panes and corridors of the hos-
pital were black holes. When I crossed the 
road the traffic terrified me, even when I 
was accompanied. I am very insecure while 
walking; indeed I am more afraid now than 
before the operation.70 
 
As for other newly sighted people, the 
change from a condition of independence and 
autonomy to that of uncertainty and inadequa-
cy eventually resulted in depressive disorders.71 
Partially discrepant evidence has however been 
reported by Fine and colleagues, who described 
the case of a patient, MM, who recovered vi-
sion of his right eye at the age of 43.72 Although 
MM’s 3D form, spatial details and face recogni-
tion remained significantly impaired, his capac-
ity for processing motion and color was nearly 
normal.73 This observation parallels Sacks’ re-
port: «Moving objects presented a special 
problem, for their appearance changed con-
stantly. Even his dog, he told me, looked so dif-
ferent at different times that he wondered if it 
was the same dog».74 The discrepancy between 
these two reports has been attributed to the dif-
ferent level of visual skill development at the 
time at which visual deprivation occurred.75 
Gregory and Wallace’s report seems to sug-
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gest that patients who have been blind most of 
their lives can recover visual acuity and color 
vision, but have difficulties perceiving depth 
and motion as well as integrating information 
over time from different visual perspectives in-
to a unitary visual scene.76 Thus, according to 
Gregory and Wallace,77 the case of SB demon-
strates that the processes that allow integrating 
information over space and time are funda-
mental to the faculty of seeing. Moreover, the 
observation of SB shows that early touch expe-
rience strongly influences later visual experi-
ence: as demonstrated by SB’s proficiency in 
recognizing upper-case letters, tactile experience 
can transfer to vision, even many years later. 
Conversely, his inability to recognize lower-case 
letters, which he did not learn by touch, might be 
at least partially due to his difficulty in shifting 
perceptual strategies from touching to seeing.78 
Overall, these data provide support for the idea 
of crossmodal transfer, which will be more ex-
tensively covered in the following Section. 
 
█ The nativism-empiricism debate  
 on the relations of the senses 
 
Molyneux’s question raises several pivotal 
issues, in fields ranging from philosophy and 
epistemology to psychology. Among these nu-
merous issues, one of the most central is un-
doubtedly the controversy between those who 
support an empiricist theory of knowledge and 
those supporting a nativist (or rationalist) 
one.79 In Davis’s words, the Molyneux problem 
can even be considered the «progenitor of the 
nativism-empiricism controversy of the latter 
half of the XIXth century».80 It should be not-
ed, however, that due to the variety of conclu-
sions proposed by nativist philosophers, the 
position of empiricists and nativists sometimes 
did not differ to such a great extent.81 
From his reply to Molyneux’s question, it is 
clear that Locke rejected the nativist view that 
the mind contains innate ideas, instead embrac-
ing the radically empiricist position that the 
mind originates as a “blank slate” (a tabula rasa), 
receiving all knowledge from experience. Ac-
cording to a provocative claim, «Locke replied 
‘Not’ to Molyneux’s question to avoid postulat-
ing a common representational scheme for the 
different senses, because such a schema implies 
an innate supra-sensible structure to the 
mind».82 Although refusing innate associative 
representations of shapes across the senses, Locke 
believed that these “common sensible” (i.e., su-
pramodal abstract ideas) can be rapidly estab-
lished through experience by mean of the integra-
tion of information delivered by the senses. His 
position, leading to a negative answer, is shared 
by other scholars, such as Molyneux himself, 
Berkeley, Condillac, Reid, Voltaire and Hume.  
By contrast, nativist philosophers, such as 
Leibniz, Synge and Diderot, providing affirma-
tive answers to Molyneux’s question, tended to 
highlight the role of inborn ideas. For them, ab-
stract ideas about the world are present at birth 
and a shape can be recognized, independently 
from the sensory modality by which it is per-
ceived, by matching it to the corresponding pre-
existing concept. Among the thinkers support-
ing nativism, Leibniz, although refusing the ex-
istence of common sensibles, claims that 
knowledge of the similarities between tactile and 
visual representations can be understood 
through reasoning.83 Diverging positions regard-
ing the existence of common sensibles led to the 
issue of how the senses relate to each other, a 
topic that has raised a huge amount of interest 
and investigations across different disciplines.84 
Some philosophers have espoused a hierar-
chical approach to the relationship among the 
senses, by arranging the senses in descending or-
der of merit.85 Since the time of ancient Greece, 
sight has often been placed at the top of the hi-
erarchy of the senses, thereby justifying the defi-
nition of Western culture as “visual-centric”.86 
The claim for the hegemony of sight is rooted in 
the idea that only the faculty of vision provides 
access to contemplation, thence to cognition, 
and in the last instance, to philosophy itself, 
whereas touch, the contact sense par excellence, 
thus intimately related with matter, is the dirty 
sense.87 As claimed by Plato in Timaeus:  
 
our sight has indeed proved to be a source 
of supreme benefit to us, in that none of our 
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present statements about the universe could 
ever have been made if we had never seen 
any stars, sun, or heaven. As it is, however, 
our ability to see the periods of day-and-
night, of months and of years, of equinoxes 
and solstices, has led to the invention of 
number and has given us the idea of time 
and opened the path to inquiry into the na-
ture of the universe.88  
 
This attitude toward sight still echoes in the 
Renaissance, in Leonardo da Vinci’s words: 
«The sense of sight is the Lord and command-
er of the others»,89 or, later, in Locke himself, 
who considered sight as «the most compre-
hensive of all our senses».90 The most para-
digmatic example of the primacy of vision over 
the other senses is nevertheless represented by 
the intellectual movement of Enlightenment as 
a process of progressive clarification, marking 
the transition from darkness to light, from ob-
scure to clear ideas.  
By contrast, some scholars have considered 
touch as the main source of knowledge. For in-
stance, Condillac claimed that «all knowledge 
derives from the senses, above all the sense of 
touch».91 Consistently, and according to the 
Cartesian conception of the senses, the capacity 
of the blind to “see with the hands” (or sticks) is 
the best way of accessing the real character of 
sight, as a disciplined probing of the unknown.92 
Thus, touch is not only “another form of 
sight”93, but sight is «modelled after the sense of 
touch».94 Along the same lines, Diderot believes 
that it is through tactile experience that sight ac-
quires spatial cognition. In Diderot’s words, 
«touch serves a great deal to give the eye precise 
knowledge of the conformity between an object 
and the representation of it that the eye re-
ceives».95 This observation that touch informs 
the eye has been neglected until recently.96 
A different approach, dating back to Aristo-
tle, avoids a hierarchical description of the rela-
tionship between touch and sight, highlighting 
instead not only their commonalities, but also 
their discrepancies, thus suggesting the possi-
bility for reciprocal interplay.97 In his On the 
Soul, Aristotle98 considers both touch and sight 
as fundamental senses, with their own specifici-
ties. As pointed out by Jütte,99 this position has 
given rise to the apparent contradiction of rat-
ing touch as either at the bottom of the hierar-
chy of the senses, if arranged according to their 
merit, or at the top, being the sense that reaches 
its highest level of development in humans. Un-
like other senses, which are tuned to distant 
stimuli , touch is the primordial sense of imme-
diacy and provides the experience of concrete-
ness and corporeity. Moreover, touch is coter-
minous with animal existence since destroying 
the sense of touch is equivalent to destroying 
the animal itself. Whereas touch is the most 
basic sense, sight provides the most fulfilling 
experience of sensoriality and access to science 
itself («of all the senses, sight best helps us to 
know things, and reveals many distinc-
tions»).100 In the Aristotelian view, each sense 
refers to a specific object of perception; for this 
reason, the absence of a sense cannot be com-
pensated by the others. However, besides af-
firming the uniqueness of each sense, Aristotle 
also assumes that there are qualities  – sensibilia 
communia – which can be experienced via mul-
tiple sensory channels. In his On the Soul, Aristo-
tle points out that experiences that are shared by 
more than one sense – such as number, motion, 
rest, extension, shape and size – can be accessed 
by the faculty called sensus communis. This facul-
ty allows crossmodal comparisons between sen-
sory qualities common to different senses and 
their unification into a single percept.101 
The idea of a sensus communis persisted 
throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance, 
and conjectures flourished about where infor-
mation from all modalities would converge 
within the brain in order to be utilized by high-
er cognitive functions.102 In the Cartesian mod-
el, sensory information from different modali-
ties are unified in the pineal gland, the only 
place in the body that is not double and where  
 
the two images coming through the two eyes, 
or the two impressions coming from a single 
object through the double organs of any other 
sense, can come together in a single image or 
impression before reaching the soul.103  
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Centuries after Aristotle’s proposal, Mau-
rice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), refusing the 
hierarchical approach to the study of sensory 
perception, suggested that the senses, although 
distinct, were nevertheless strictly intercon-
nected. Indeed, each sense belongs to a certain 
field and «interrogates the object in its own 
way»,104 but the impressions acquired by means 
of the senses are then merged together and with 
the body itself. This conjecture leads Merleau-
Ponty to espouse a definition of the human be-
ing in terms of a sensorium commune, as original-
ly proposed by Johann Gottfried von Herder.105 
Thus, across the centuries, the belief that 
each sense processes information in a qualita-
tively different manner and the belief in the ne-
cessity for a supramodal reconciliation of sen-
sory information have both survived. These 
assumptions have been translated into various 
approaches which aim to study how the senses 
differ according to various features, such as in 
terms of their external objects of perception, or 
their intrinsic characters (qualia),106 or the neu-
rophysiological substrates underpinning the 
internal processing of their information.107 On 
the behavioural level, the observation that each 
sense seems best adapted to convey certain 
types of information has been translated into 
the modality appropriateness hypothesis, a 
theory according to which perception is domi-
nated by the modality that provides the most 
reliable information.108 For example, vision 
dominates in spatial tasks, haptics in fine tex-
tural judgments, and hearing in temporal 
judgments. In the light of the empirical evi-
dence gathered during the last decades, this 
view has been considerably reconsidered, in fa-
vour of other approaches supporting the idea 
that the human perceptual system is inherently 
multisensory. Indeed, humans live in a world 
constantly providing information from differ-
ent sensory modalities. The issue of how the 
information delivered by different sensory 
channels is processed and bound together into 
unitary and coherent percepts, the so-called 
binding problem109 has increasingly challenged 
the assumption of perception as being divided 
into separate sensory domains.110 
As can be inferred from this digression, the 
questions at the core of the nativist-empiricist 
dialogue, concerning human nature, the state 
of the world and ideas, is not only central to 
philosophical debate, but also central in the 
field of cognitive sciences, where it is often re-
ferred to as the “nature/nurture” controver-
sy.111 The debate concerns how knowledge 
emerges in children and what are the relative 
contributions and reciprocal relationships be-
tween perceptual systems and experience.112 
According to the “intersensory integration 
view”, whose main representative was Piaget,113 
in humans the different sensory systems do not 
interact with one another at birth. Rather, 
through prolonged experience with multisenso-
ry inputs, various sensory modalities gradually 
develop the capability to reciprocally com-
municate, thus giving rise to crossmodal func-
tions and representations. Opposed to Piaget’s 
constructivist view of development is the “in-
tersensory differentiation view”, according to 
which infants are endowed with functionally 
integrated sensory systems and are thus capable 
of perceiving crossmodal associations. Gib-
son,114 the most prominent supporter of this 
position, claims that the infants are endowed at 
birth with the capacity to extract invariants 
from sensory inputs and during development 
they become increasingly sensitive to finer su-
pramodal invariants. Thus, infants are able to 
detect the invariant properties that can be per-
ceived across different modalities, in both spa-
tial (e.g., shape, size, texture) and temporal 
(e.g., synchrony, rhythm, duration) domains. 
Across development, through interaction with 
the environment, sensitivity to this supramodal 
information is increasingly refined. 
Along these lines of research, in the last dec-
ades, a considerable number of studies have 
been devoted to the investigation of whether, 
how and to what extent infants and children 
are able to respond115 or develop116 crossmodal 
relations. In particular, the study of the cross-
modal transfer of abilities assumes a central 
role in the present context, since it entails a 
recognition of the similarities between infor-
mation gained by different sensory modalities 
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about external objects. Indirectly, it examines 
whether the senses are interconnected, so that 
infants can visually recognize the shape of an 
object that has previously only been felt by 
hand (touch-to-vision transfer) or, conversely, 
recognize by hand the shape of an object previ-
ously seen.117 Crossmodal transfer from touch 
to vision for shape was observed in one-month-
old infants118 and even in newborns babies119. 
In these studies, human newborns could recog-
nize visually the shape of an object that they 
had previously experience only by touch.120  
Interestingly, evidence of crossmodal trans-
fer has also been found in other species, such as 
monkeys.121 The fact that crossmodal transfer is 
observed in both animals and pre-verbal infants 
disproves the hypothesis that intersensory skills 
are mediated by language. Nevertheless, the 
studies conducted on developmental crossmodal 
transfer have proved to be highly dependent on 
various factors, such as the type of stimuli or 
task involved, the modality and duration of fa-
miliarization, the age of the participants and 
even the hand used for tactual exploration.122 
Moreover, developmental studies have often 
provided evidence for transfer of perception of 
object shape from touch to vision, but not from 
vision to touch.123 Although developmental 
studies tend to disconfirm the assumption of a 
unity of the senses, and help to shed light on how 
Molyneux’s question can be answered empirical-
ly124, their mixed outcomes prevent them from 
providing a definitive answer.  
 
█ Modern experimental approaches  
 to Molyneux’s question 
 
As highlighted in the Section Empirical con-
tributions to the debate, early accounts of cata-
ract operations had several methodological pit-
falls. First, the description of the pre-operative 
conditions (i.e., potential presence, duration 
and typology of visual experience) was often 
poor. Moreover, from those reports it has often 
been difficult to infer the course of the post-
operative process, which varies considerably 
from one patient to another.125 Recent im-
provements in medical and experimental pro-
cedures have contributed to a more rigorous 
assessment of the consequences of sight resto-
ration in patients suffering from congenital or 
early onset blindness through cataract removal 
or corneal transplantation.  
In the present context, investigation of the 
consequences of the re-afferentation of visual 
inputs after a period of deprivation on the pro-
cessing of information across different sensory 
modalities is of crucial importance. Project 
Prakash,126 a program recently set up in India, 
has provided an opportunity to assess this issue 
in patients who had their sight restored in adult-
hood. Testing patients who have just had cata-
racts surgically removed provides intriguing 
insight into the issue of how early visual experi-
ence affects the interplay among the senses and 
contributes to an empirical answer to 
Molyneux’s problem.127 Crucially, the patients 
tested in these studies were all treatable con-
genitally blind, with a functional central visual 
system and residual vision not exceeding light 
perception, and mature enough for reliable test-
ing. Moreover, the testing must occur as soon as 
possible, ideally immediately after the removal 
of the bandages, and be appropriate to the visual 
and tactile capabilities of the patients.128 
The participants were presented with a 
three-dimensional shape, either visually or hap-
tically, which was followed by the simultaneous 
presentation of the original object (i.e., the tar-
get) and a distractor, and were asked to recog-
nize the target. The results showed that in the 
intramodal condition (i.e., touch-to-touch and 
vision-to-vision), performance was highly accu-
rate (more than 90% of accuracy). By contrast, 
in the crossmodal conditions (i.e., touch-to-
vision) the performance dropped to near 
chance levels. Based on these data, the authors 
proposed that the answer to Molyneux’s ques-
tion is likely negative. Indeed, after restoration 
of sight the participants could distinguish be-
tween objects by touch and vision alone, but 
they were unable to perform crossmodal judg-
ments, indicating that they were unable to 
transfer shape knowledge from the tactile to the 
visual domain. Interestingly, however, when the 
tests were repeated some days after surgery, the 
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patients were able to perform the crossmodal 
task significantly better than at chance.  
Even though the mechanisms of such rapid 
learning are still unknown, some speculation 
can be advanced. Since the acquisition was rap-
id, it can be hypothesized that the neural sub-
strate responsible for crossmodal interactions 
might already be latently present before it is 
unmasked and becomes behaviourally observ-
able. Moreover, it can be inferred that the abil-
ity to form three-dimensional visual represen-
tations is preserved in people with late-onset 
vision,129 thus possibly enabling mapping be-
tween haptic and visual form representations.  
The use of neuroimaging techniques might 
provide some additional clues on this topic. It is 
well known that the occipital areas, typically en-
gaged in visual processing in the sighted, are far 
from idle in the blind, as they are recruited for 
the perceptual processing of stimuli in the 
spared sensory modalities as well as in higher 
cognitive tasks (i.e., memory, language).130 
Moreover, it has been shown that subregions 
within the occipital lobe are involved in pro-
cessing shape information across vision and 
touch.131 It thus follows that neuroimaging in-
vestigations would provide intriguing insight in-
to processes of neural reorganizational subserv-
ing the crossmodal representation of shape in 
these patients. 
The fact that a capacity to perform crossmod-
al judgments can be recovered after sight resto-
ration seems to indicate that a certain amount of 
the crossmodal reorganization of brain function 
in visual deprivation also occurs in the mature 
human brain.132 Preliminary evidence seems to 
suggest that, although cataract patients exhibited 
recovery of basic visual functions, auditory-visual 
interactions were reduced (or even absent) even 
14 years after the operation.133 Putzar et al.’s data 
provide support for the claim that early sensory 
experience is critical for the emergence of multi-
sensory integration capabilities.134 These findings 
echo in the personal report of a patient regaining 
sight in adulthood: 
 
I tune out the visual input when it is too dis-
tracting, mainly in conversations. Think of 
how distracting it is when you are speaking 
and hear an echo of your own voice. It is 
difficult to ignore that echo. Listening to 
someone speak and watching him or her at 
the same time is like that for me. It is hard 
to do both: look and listen.135  
 
Indeed, from animal studies it is known that 
visual deprivation dramatically impairs the ac-
tivity of brain structures which are pivotal in 
multisensory integration processes136 Moreo-
ver, the data provided by Putzar and col-
leagues137 also suggest the existence of a “sensi-
tive period”, that is, a critical period early in life 
during which normal visual input is necessary 
for normal development.138 Further research 
will clarify whether the recovery of crossmodal 
association capabilities between visual and tac-
tile information follow the same course as au-
diovisual interactions.  
 
█ Molyneux’s question as an enquiry  
 into spatial representation in blindness 
 
Answering Molyneux’s question also im-
plies adopting a stance in the debate regarding 
the origins and the nature of space perception. 
Indeed, a positive answer to Molyneux’s ques-
tion implies embracing the nativist assumption 
that perception of space is innate. Although not 
referring to empirical space, Immanuel Kant’s 
(1724-1804), statement that space is a «neces-
sary representation a priori»,139 is often cited as 
the most paradigmatic example of this position. 
Furthermore, a positive answer also assumes 
that perception of space can be acquired 
through various sensory modalities, including 
touch (it is supramodal).  
By contrast, a negative answer implies that 
vision is necessary in acquiring spatial 
knowledge and no other sensory modality can 
contribute to the notion of space like vision. 
This view is supported by the evidence that 
senses convey phenomenologically diverse im-
pressions. For instance, unlike sight, which al-
lows for the simultaneous perception of objects 
located within our visual field, touch requires 
the sequential acquisition of tactile impres-
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sions, and their subsequent synthesis into uni-
tary percepts.140 As observed by Berkeley,  
 
we can perceive, at the same time, great va-
riety of visible objects, very separate and 
distinct from each other. Now, tangible ex-
tension being made up of several distinct 
co-existent parts, we may hence gather an-
other reason that may dispose us to imagine 
a likeness or analogy between the immedi-
ate objects of sight and touch.141 
 
 This view thus implies that the senses are 
radically incommensurable and convey highly 
specific sensory impressions.142 The fact that, 
according to this view, blind individuals never 
have the chance to experience the simultaneity 
of spatial concepts, has led to the observation 
that the temporal aspect of experience, and not 
the spatial aspect, is relevant to the blind: 
«time serves the person born blind instead of 
space».143 
The debate about the presence of spatial 
knowledge in the newly sighted is rather specu-
lative, since, as already remarked, Molyneux’s 
question implies that the recognition of the ob-
jects is performed “at first sight”. Thus, the ap-
proach postulating that spatial knowledge, ac-
quired through touch, can be successfully trans-
ferred to vision when the latter is regained, also 
assumes that this process occurs immediately 
after the bandages are removed. It is thus clear 
that such an approach, although rejecting the 
idea that a concept of space is completely in-
nate, nevertheless tends to minimize the role of 
experience. As might be inferred, during the 
XVIII century, a number of intermediate 
stances flourished around the question of the 
existence and the nature of spatial knowledge 
in blindness. For instance, Berkeley, in his Essay 
Towards a New Theory of Vision claims that the 
perception of space is primarily a tactile phe-
nomenon and that sight cannot contribute to 
building spatial ideas. Concepts like the dis-
tance between objects, their magnitude and po-
sition, can thus only be accessed by touch. 
However, if spatial cognition was only restrict-
ed to touch, some spatial judgments, like spatial 
coincidence, would not be possible. Thus, in 
order to acquire a complete spatial awareness 
cooperation between the two senses is neces-
sary. Known as the “touch educates vision” 
idea,144 this view thus postulates that spatial 
ideas can nevertheless be transferred to vision 
through experience.145 
Even though he starts from the opposite 
point of view, Condillac, in his Treatise on the 
sensations, reaches a similar position. Like 
Berkeley, he attributes great relevance to learn-
ing and experiencing the interplay between tac-
tile and visual modalities. A person regaining 
sight would only perceive indefinite visual im-
pressions, lacking boundaries or shapes, with 
no precise spatial locations. It follows that the 
newly sighted must learn to discern, how the 
rough visual impressions received, convey the 
perception of depth and solidity, which is, in 
his opinion, pivotal to developing an awareness 
of the spatial features of external objects. The 
concept of space is thus acquired, by combining 
these raw, non spatial data, with the tactile sen-
sations resulting from touching the objects. He 
argues that it is only through the sense of touch 
that humans acquire the concepts of extension 
and shape. 
The idea that associations between the im-
pressions received from touch and sight are 
crucial in conveying the notion of space is also 
present in other authors.146 However, as Mer-
leau-Ponty highlighted decades later, the postu-
late that different sensory modalities convey 
their own experience of the world, which is in-
herently a spatial world, implies that «all of the 
senses are spatial». Despite originating in vari-
ous sensory domains, the information delivered 
by the different senses is then merged into «a 
total experience in which they are ultimately 
indiscernible».147 Merleau-Ponty, thus, intro-
duces the intriguing possibility of the coexisting 
unity and diversity of the senses. For him, the 
newly sighted, although provided with the no-
tion of space,148 is simply astonished by the 
novelty of space as perceived visually, which is 
somehow discrepant from what has been per-
ceived until then via tactile experience; this is 
similar to the same sense of novelty we experi-
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ence when we first meet a person we had previ-
ously only known on the phone. 
As pointed out by Davis, the attenuation of 
the position of both the empiricists, who could 
not deny the contribution of inborn ideas, and 
the nativists, who admitted the importance of 
experience, made the debate over the XVIII 
century rather inconclusive, just as in the 
Molyneux problem. Recently, however, empiri-
cal findings about perceptual functions in pa-
tients who had gained sight have provided in-
teresting insight into these issues, thus making 
some contribution to the discussion of whether 
the perception of space is innate or acquired, 
and whether visual experience is necessary to 
acquire spatial knowledge. According to von 
Senden, blind individuals cannot develop any 
absolute spatial concepts from the sense of 
touch, but only «relational concepts, ordered 
sequences and schemata». For this reason, 
once they regain sight, they are unable to con-
nect the sensory impressions – or tactual sche-
mata – received by the sense of touch to what is 
perceived by sight. In von Senden’s words, tac-
tual schema has «so little of the really spatial 
about it that cannot be applied forthwith, once 
the operation is over, to the spatiality of 
sight».149 It is thus clear that for von Senden 
the establishment of abstract–supramodal–
spatial concepts is prevented by the inherent 
specificity of the sensory modalities.  
The question of whether individuals who 
have never experienced vision can develop a 
sense of space is also a matter of debate within 
the scientific community.150 Traditionally, vi-
sion is considered to be the sensory modality 
that provides the most accurate and reliable 
spatial information.151 As pointed out above, 
the perceptual experience provided by vision is, 
unlike that provided by touch, not sequential, 
but simultaneous, and the nature of the domi-
nant sensory experience has been proved to 
have some influence on spatial coding and cog-
nitive functioning.152 In his report about the 
post-surgical experience of Virgil, Sacks re-
marks: «while Virgil could recognize individu-
al letters easily, he could not string them to-
gether» and below «he could still easily read 
the inscriptions on war memorials and tomb-
stones by touch. But his eyes seemed to fix on 
particular letters and to be incapable of the easy 
movement, the scanning, that is needed to 
read». More in general, he seems unable to 
«synthesize them, to form a complex percep-
tion at a glance».153 
Other researchers, however, have argued 
that, although endowed with senses that are 
possibly less adequate for conveying spatial in-
formation, blind individuals can acquire a rep-
resentation of space which is not necessarily 
any less adequate than that of the sighted.154 
Indeed, blindness has been shown to have an 
impact that is not too dramatic in many tasks, 
including spatial imagery155 and navigation.156 
One of the most striking demonstrations of the 
high proficiency of blind people in processing 
and representing spatial information originates 
from the studies exploring auditory skills in vis-
ual deprivation.157 For instance, it has been re-
ported that blind individuals are more proficient 
than sighted individuals at localizing sounds,158 
especially if they are arranged in peripheral 
space159 have a better discrimination of features 
of sounds, such as spectral160 or echo cues,161 and 
a more efficient ability to relate proprioceptive 
cues to auditory spatial information.162  
Furthermore, blind individuals have been 
shown to represent knowledge spatially, in a 
manner that is similar to that seen in sighted 
individuals, in numerical cognition,163 or while 
drawing.164 Neuroimaging data also show that 
the same brain circuit known as the occipito-
parietal pathway (the “where” pathway), acti-
vated in the sighted while processing spatial 
features of visual stimuli165, is activated in blind 
people during processing of spatial attributes of 
auditory and tactile sensory information.166 
This evidence suggests that spatial processing 
can be amodally represented at a neural level.167  
Overall, the absence of a generalized im-
pairment of spatial perceptual processing as a 
consequence of visual deprivation seems to be 
consistent with the hypothesis that the intact 
senses, can nevertheless contribute, and possi-
bly compensate for the absence of visual infor-
mation in the acquisition of spatial cognition.168 
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Individuals lacking visual experience, thus, 
seem to differ from the sighted not because of a 
diminished capacity for building spatial repre-
sentations, an ability which seems to be pre-
served, but rather, in their strategic use of spa-
tial information. Indeed, with visual depriva-
tion spatial coding is predominantly based on 
egocentric coordinates, resulting, for instance, 
in a dramatic bias in localizing tactile stimula-
tion delivered on the upper limbs,169 in pointing 
to proximal memorised proprioceptive targets 
and in the preferential reliance on an egocentric 
frame of reference while encoding spatial in-
formation in large scale environments.170 Intri-
guingly, in his autobiographical report, the 
writer John Hull states that «space is reduced 
to one’s own body» and that the perception of 
the surrounding space is reached by shifting the 
attention to the senses other than vision, lead-
ing to describe himself as a «whole-body seer». 
In this perspective, rain is described as having 
«a way of bringing out the contours of every-
thing […] the steadily falling rain creates conti-
nuity of acoustic experience gives a sense of 
perspective and of the actual relationships of 
one part of the world to another».171 
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests 
that the idea that blindness is associated with 
an absence of any spatial concepts is mislead-
ing, if not groundless. But if, as seems demon-
strated by experimental studies, the intact sens-
es can endow blind individuals with spatial 
knowledge, then the question remains as to 
why, once sight is restored, this spatial 
knowledge is not transferred to the processing 
of visual percepts, at least not immediately after 
an operation.172 According to Held,173 one rea-
son why this crossmodal transfer does not oc-
cur right after the operation could be the inher-
ent heterogeneity of sensory modalities. This 
heterogeneity makes the association of what 
has been experienced through touch to what is 
now perceived by sight difficult for the newly 
sighted. It thus follows that, according to 
Held,174 in order to acquire the capacity to 
make this association, some experience is nec-
essary. Indeed, crossmodal transfer can occur 
only if previous experience makes haptic and 
visual representations predictable.175 In the case 
of a person who has just regained sight, this 
cannot occur. In the following section, the im-
plications of Held’s view will be more exten-
sively described. 
 
█ Conclusion 
 
Molyneux’s problem has triggered a huge 
debate in a variety of disciplines, ranging from 
philosophy to cognitive sciences and, more re-
cently, neuroscience. As noted throughout the 
paper, Molyneux, by proposing his problem, 
sets conditions and assumptions that have been 
differently interpreted and considered by other 
scholars, thus leading to a number of discrep-
ant interpretations. Moreover, the fact that 
Molyeux’s problem has been addressed from 
many perspectives and fragmented into sub-
domains has generated a multiplication of in-
quiries and consequently a «plurality of an-
swers».176 It thus follows that, despite the re-
markable interest that has arisen across time 
around this topic, and the increasing amount of 
evidence that aims to address this issue, a con-
clusive answer to the original question is still 
lacking and may be difficult to obtain. 
As highlighted by Paterson, among the crit-
ical issues involved in the debate there is the 
distinction between the capacity of the newly 
sighted to distinguish circles and squares, and 
the question as to whether she/he, who can 
now see, can recognize and name shapes former-
ly known by touch. These two questions have 
often been treated as a single question,177 thus 
generating confounds between genuinely per-
ceptual and more complex, cognitive and lin-
guistic, skills.178 Making the patient aware that 
the discrimination must be performed between 
a sphere and a cube is considered by some 
scholars a prerequisite of the successful solution 
of the conundrum,179 whereas others, like Con-
dillac, have supported the necessity of avoiding 
leading questions.180 The possibility of address-
ing this issue not only through a speculative 
approach, but on the basis of empirical evi-
dence, has contributed to assessing it via more 
controlled methodologies. For instance, the 
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opportunity to test animals and pre-lingual 
children has offered the valuable opportunity 
of avoiding potential confounds related to the 
use of language, both in presenting the question 
and in recording the participant’s responses.  
Although, according to Gallagher,181 earlier 
experimental studies contributed to answering 
Molyneux’s question, a study recently conduct-
ed by Held and colleagues has turned the de-
bate around.182 The results of the studies by 
Held and colleagues suggest that the newly 
sighted participants did not show an immedi-
ate transfer of their tactile shape perception to 
the visual domain, but that they were able to 
acquire this skill after a short period of expo-
sure (i.e., five days) to the visual world. Accord-
ing to Held and colleagues,183 experience is nec-
essary in order to acquire the capacity to make 
associations across sensory modalities, and to 
recognize by sight the same shape that was pre-
viously perceived by touch. The fact that expe-
rience allows us to build associations among the 
senses even later in life is, according to Held,184 
an evolutionary mechanism enabling humans 
to dynamically adapt to the inherent heteroge-
neity of the senses.185 As is known from multi-
ple sources of evidence, touch and vision, 
though heterogeneous, can be used in conjunc-
tion after undergoing a process of calibra-
tion.186 According to Held, visual deprivation 
can intervene as a source of perturbation in this 
process.187 The perceptual disturbance deter-
mined by blindness requires a rapid remapping 
of the sensory information received via vision 
and touch when the former is restored, similar 
to the recalibration which occurs in experi-
mental conditions that simulate sensory con-
flicts.188 The rapidity by which crossmodal 
transfer is established nevertheless suggests 
that the neural substrates responsible for 
crossmodal interactions are already present, 
but in a covert manner.189 By extension, this ev-
idence supports the idea of pre-existing inborn 
correspondences between the senses, thus dis-
confirming the response provided by Molyneux 
and Locke. These correspondences would be-
come functional through a process of recalibra-
tion rather than of perceptual learning,190 paral-
leling the changes in the reliability of infor-
mation provided by each sensory modality.191 
Thus, the time course of the crossmodal recali-
bration processes following visual restoration 
points to diverging answers to Molyneux’s 
question: whereas the absence of immediate 
crossmodal transfer supports a negative an-
swer, its rapid re-establishment leans toward 
the opposite conclusion. The use of the cataract 
paradigm adds additional methodological is-
sues. In particular, the level of reliance on vi-
sion and the efficiency of visual skills at the 
moment of testing are crucial in assessing 
crossmodal links in sightrestored patients.192  
Moreover, cognitive adaptation to recover-
ing visual skills has proved to be highly prob-
lematic in post-surgery patients, as reported by 
various sources.193 Unlike people who have 
been seeing for their entire life, for whom vi-
sion just happens, without requiring any effort, 
for people who regain vision in adulthood, the 
overwhelming amount of new information to 
be decoded, besides seeming highly confusing, 
poses relevant cognitive demands. Often, these 
efforts do not result insatisfactory results, mak-
ing the restored sight deficient in some respect, 
such as depth or motion perception, and in dis-
appointed expectations. What is more, as in Ol-
iver Sacks’s words: «In the newly sighted, 
learning to see demands a radical change in 
neurological functioning, in self, in identity».194 
The upsetting feelings following sight restora-
tion might result in what has been described as 
a “visual shutdown”, the withdrawal from any 
visual experiences,195 or even, in the most dra-
matic cases, in deep depression. This evidence 
raises the intriguing question of blindness as a 
condition of “less”, but rather as a different ex-
pression of experience, one as adaptive and ful-
filling as experience endowed with the whole 
range of senses can be. 
Another factor affecting crossmodal inter-
action after sight restoration is the presence of 
visual experience before blindness, as has been 
experimentally proven.196 Moreover, it should 
be noted that the approaches involving the in-
vestigation of crossmodal interactions at vary-
ing intervals after surgery are very valuable for 
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experimental and developmental neuroscience, 
but are likely less suitable for answering the 
philosophical issues posed by Molyneux’s ques-
tion, which implies the assessment of cross-
modal links right after sight restoration.  
As mentioned above, another issue that has 
attracted lots of attention within the debate on 
Molyneux’s question is whether the newly 
sighted, after having discriminated the shapes 
visually, could possibly assign them a name. 
This issue has been addressed by Held and col-
leagues by asking their participants to perform 
a match-to-sample task, thus asking them to 
(non-verbally) indicate which of the two ob-
jects had been presented previously. Notably, 
none of the objects had a spatial configuration 
that could be ascribable to a prototypical geo-
metrical shape, so that no linguistic labels could 
be assigned to them.197 Whereas the distinction 
between shapes only requires differentiating 
between two stimuli, the process of naming 
them involves matching what is currently expe-
rienced by sight with the knowledge acquired 
in the past by touch. This process implies the 
existence – or the immediate establishment – 
of semantic commonalities between the two 
sets of experience. The issue of how nature and 
nurture contribute to conceptual processing 
and whether blindness affects the development 
of conceptual categories has become a central 
topic in cognitive science.198 In a recent review, 
Bedny and Saxe suggested that, despite the dis-
crepancies in their sensory experiences, blind 
and sighted people acquire and represent typi-
cal concepts in a similar way. Interestingly, 
blind people have been shown to acquire rich 
and rather accurate knowledge of concepts that 
are not experienced perceptually, such as con-
cepts related to colors, thus suggesting that 
some knowledge can be acquired through non-
sensory mechanisms, such as language.199 The 
fact that semantic knowledge can be developed 
separately from experience, in a modality-
independent manner, could constitute addi-
tional evidence in support of a positive answer 
to Molyneux’s question. 
An alternative method that could contrib-
ute in shedding light on Molyneux’s problem is 
the use of sensory substitution devices 
(SSDs).200 SSDs are devices used to transform 
visual information into information in another 
sensory modality that can by processed by the 
blind (i.e., touch or hearing).201 A recently de-
signed device, called vOICe, is based on visual-
auditory conversion: via a computing device, 
vOICe converts visual information into sounds 
delivered through earphones.202 Another posi-
tive aspect of the use of SSDs is that they allow 
new acquisition of sensory information about 
the external world in a way that − unlike sur-
gery − is not invasive and relatively cheap. Af-
ter adequate training with vOICe, blind people 
report that their percepts, initially mono-
chrome and flat, acquire additional features. 
Visual perception conveyed by the current 
SSDs has often been considered inadequate to 
convey the complexity of the visual world 
sighted people deal with in their everyday life 
situations. More specifically, it lacks visual qua-
lia, the emotional and subjective properties of 
perceptual experiences, thus resulting in a mere 
representation of sensory properties of the ob-
jects perceived.203 Furthermore, the current 
SSDs are used to represent only relatively sim-
ple visual patterns, typically isolated visual ele-
ments with a high figure-background contrast. 
The vOICe, in particular, is designed to pro-
vide a continuous stream of auditory infor-
mation to the user, at the same time dramatical-
ly curbing the possibility of accessing auditory 
inputs from the external world, which are a high-
ly reliable source of sensory orientation for blind 
people. These factors, along with psychological 
variables, have prevented the transfer of the use 
of SSDs from lab environments to the real world. 
For instance, one aspect that is usually neglected 
is whether blind people really feel the need to 
see, or if instead this need is just assumed in the 
sight-centric view of sighted perceivers.204  
Despite these downsides, the use of vOICe 
has proved to be effective in gradually enabling 
blind individuals to recognize shapes.205 In their 
study, Amedi and co-workers presented objects 
that were recognizable both by their shape (vis-
ual information transformed into vOICe signals, 
or touch) and by their sounds to vOICe experts, 
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and asked them to identify and covertly name 
them. Object recognition via vOICe activated 
occipito-temporal cortex in participants trained 
to interpret them and extract their shape infor-
mation and not in those who had been taught 
the associations between the sound patterns and 
the objects. Interestingly, this brain area is 
known to be robustly activated by the explora-
tion of objects in both visual and tactile modali-
ties in sighted people. These data suggest the in-
triguing possibility that occipito-temporal cortex 
could constitute a «metamodal operator for 
shape».206 More broadly, these data can be 
overall considered as the clue that while blind-
ness induces dramatic reorganizational process-
es in the brain regions involved in coding senso-
ry aspects of experience, the neural organization 
of conceptual knowledge is largely unaffected. 
This evidence leads to the suggestion that con-
cepts might have «core abstract components 
that develop independent from the sensory qual-
ity of experience».207 
In conclusion, a clear and definitive answer 
to Molyneux’s question — at least as it was 
originally posed — is difficult to achieve. Possi-
bly, as highlighted by Glenney,208 the most par-
simonious way to face the issue raised by 
Molyneux’s question is to avoid the polariza-
tion of the answer into the categories of “yes” 
and “no”. Indeed, the most promising ap-
proaches seem to derive from the combination 
of diverse techniques, addressing both the be-
havioural and the neural aspects of this issue. 
Whether or not a conclusive answer can be 
found, Molyneux's richly complex question has 
proved to be one of the most hotly contested 
topics in cognitive science for over three centu-
ries and promises to continue inspiring mutli-
disciplinary research into how knowledge is 
constructed in the absence of vision. 
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